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Abstract
We propose a semiparametric estimator within the class of indirect methods. Specifically,
we model private valuations through a set of conditional moment restrictions. Our econometric
model calls for a two step procedure. In the first step we recover a sample of pseudo private
values while using a Local Polynomial Estimator. In the second step we use a GMM procedure
to obtain an estimate for the parameter of interest. The proposed semiparametric estimator
is shown to have desirable statistical properties namely, it is consistent and has an asymptotic
normal distribution. Moreover, the estimator attains the parametric rate of convergence.
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1 Introduction
From a theoretical point of view, auctions are modeled as games of incomplete information in which
asymmetric information among players (seller/buyer and bidders) is one of the key features. See
for example Krishna (2002), McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Wilson (1992). From an applied
perspective, since auctions are widely used mechanisms to allocate goods and services which are
often public, many data sets are available for empirical research. By assuming that observed bids
are the equilibrium outcomes of the underlying auction model under consideration, the structural
approach to analyze auction data provides a framework in which the theoretical model and its
empirical counterpart are closely related. The main objective of this approach is then to recover
the structural elements of the auction model. This line of research has been considerably developed
in the last fifteen years. The difficulties in estimating auction models are many. First, auction
models lead to highly nonlinear econometric models through the equilibrium strategies. Second,
auction models may not lead to tractable solutions rendering even more difficult the derivation
of an econometric model. Third, the estimation of auction models often requires the numerical
computation of the equilibrium strategy and its inverse.
As documented by Perrigne and Vuong (1999, 2008) several contributions to the structural es-
timation of first-price auction models are available in the literature.1 We distinguish two kinds of
methods for estimating structural auction models: Direct methods and indirect methods. Direct
Methods were first developed in the literature relying on parametric econometric models. Starting
from a specification of the underlying distribution of private values, the objective of direct methods
is to estimate the parameter vector characterizing such a distribution. Within this class of methods,
there are between two major estimation procedures. The first methodology introduced by Paarsch
(1992) and Donald and Paarsch (1993) is a fully parametric setup that uses Maximum Likelihood
(ML)-based estimation procedures requiring the computation of the equilibrium strategy. This in
turn could be highly computationally demanding, as recognized by Donald and Paarsch (1993),
1See also Paarsch and Hong (2006) for an extensive survey on structural estimation of auction models within the
Independent Private Value (IPV) paradigm.
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and thus only very simple distributions are considered in practice. In particular, because the upper
bound of the bid distribution depends on the parameter(s) of the underlying distribution, the ML
estimator has a nonstandard limiting distribution. In view of this, Donald and Paarsch (1993)
develop a so-called piecewise pseudo ML estimator requiring the computation of the equilibrium
strategy that can be obtained using specific parametric distribution(s). Laffont, Ossard and Vuong
(1995) introduced a second methodology, which is more computationally convenient. Relying on
the revenue equivalence theorem, the authors propose a simulation-based method that avoids com-
putation of the equilibrium strategy and therefore allows for more general parametric specifications
for the private value distribution.
More recently Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) (GPV (2000) hereafter) have developed a fully
nonparametric indirect procedure introducing the use of indirect methods for the structural esti-
mation of auction models. This alternative methodology relies on a simple but crucial observation,
namely each private value can be expressed as a function of the corresponding bid, the distribution
of observed bids and its density using the first-order condition of the bidder’s optimization problem.
Based on this equation, which defines the inverse of the equilibrium strategy, the authors show that
the model is nonparametrically identified. Other papers by the same authors and others follow
entertaining other auction models in a similar fashion such as models with affiliation among pri-
vate values, models with asymmetric bidders, dynamic auction models and models with risk averse
bidders. Therefore, in contrast to direct methods, indirect methods start from the distribution of
observed bids in order to estimate the distribution of unobserved private values without computing
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy or its inverse explicitly. This calls naturally for a two step
procedure. In the first step, a sample of pseudo private valuations is obtained while using (say)
kernel estimators for the distribution and density of observed bids. With this pseudo sample at
hand, the second step consists in estimating nonparametrically the density of bidders’ private val-
ues. GPV (2000) also establish some asymptotic properties of their estimator, namely its uniform
consistency and the achievement of the optimal consistency rate by appropriate vanishing rates for
bandwidths, while the optimal rate is derived using the minimax theory as developed by Ibragimov
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and Has’minskii (1981).
Though a fully nonparametric estimator has some desirable properties such as flexibility and
robustness to misspecification, it has a number of drawbacks such as a slow consistency rate and
the difficulty to consider a large number of covariates by the so-called curse of dimensionality. In
this paper, we propose a semiparametric estimator within the class of indirect methods. In the
same spirit as GPV (2000) our procedure is in two steps. Unlike GPV (2000), our second step
is fully parametric and therefore our resulting model falls within the category of semiparametric
models. Specifically, we propose to model private valuations through a set of conditional moment
restrictions.2
For sake of simplicity, we consider a symmetric first-price sealed-bid auction model within the
independent private value (IPV) paradigm with a nonbinding reserve price. As shown below, our
estimation procedure applies to a more general class of auction models, namely symmetric and
asymmetric affiliated private value models. More generally, our method extends to models which
have been estimated using a nonparametric indirect procedure. Let Vp`, p = 1, . . . , I`, ` = 1, . . . , L
denote the private value of the pth bidder for the `th auctioned object. Let Z` ≡ (X`, I`) ∈ IRd+1
denote the vector of exogenous variables, it includes the number of bidders I` and variables X`
characterizing object heterogeneity across auctions.3 We model private values by the following set
of conditional moment restrictions
E[M(V,Z; θ0)|Z] = 0, (1)
for some known function M(·, ·; θ) : IRd+2 → IRq and θ ∈ IRp. However, such moment restrictions
are infeasible in practice since private values are unobserved.
2A noticeable exception is found in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) which use a fully parametric indirect
procedure to entertain a large number of covariates. The authors do not provide, however, any asymptotic properties
for their estimator.
3The dependence of the private value distribution on I` captures the idea that private values and the number of
bidders can be dependent in general. For instance, objects of higher value may attract more bidders. The number
of bidders may capture some unobserved heterogeneity. It may also result from endogenous participation. Note also
that the reserve price is nonbinding so that the number of potential bidders I` in the `th auction is known. This
assumption can be relaxed and our results can be straightforwardly extended in a similar way as in GPV (2000,
Section 4).
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From the theoretical model we know that the equilibrium bid, B, can be expressed as B =
s(V,Z; θ0, γ0), where γ0 could be an infinite dimensional parameter. Therefore the equilibrium
strategy depends on the parameter vector θ0 both directly since B ∼ G(·|Z; θ0, γ0) (say) and
indirectly through V since V ∼ F (·|Z; θ0, γ0). A natural way of expressing the above conditions
would be
E{M [s−1(B,Z; θ0, γ0), Z; θ0]|Z} = 0.
The above condition requires the computation of the equilibrium strategy as well as of its inverse.
This could be highly computationally demanding for two different reasons. First, such computation
has to be carried out for any trial value of the parameters (θ, γ). When γ is an infinite dimensional
parameter the model falls within the class of models analyzed by Ai and Chen (2003). Second,
in a more general class of models, the computation of the equilibrium strategy s(·, ·; θ0, γ0) and
of its inverse is much more involved such as for affiliated private value models. Furthermore, in
asymmetric models this computation becomes intractable.
We therefore propose to replace V in (1) by its nonparametric estimator Vˆ = ξˆ(B,Z) to make
the moment condition operational. Thus the “conditional moment restriction” that we use in our
second step is as follows
E{M [ξˆ(B,Z), Z; θ0]|Z} ≈ 0.
It is worth noting that Vˆ = ξˆ(B,Z) is obtained nonparametrically by means of local polyno-
mial fitting. Unlike other nonparametric estimators, such us kernels, local polynomial fitting is
an attractive method from a theoretical and practical point of view. As pointed out by Fan and
Gijbels (1995), local polynomial estimators (LPE) have some advantages over other commonly used
nonparametric estimators including the absence of boundary effects. As it is well known, many
nonparametric estimators are ill-behaved close to the boundaries of the support. A common way
to deal with this problem is to trim out observations in these problematic regions. In this paper,
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we use a LPE which is not subject to boundary effects and therefore we do not have to trim out
observations. This is a remarkable advantage of our procedure since otherwise the trimming would
have to be performed on the endogenous variable of the model introducing an additional technical
difficulty because this trimming on the bids, which implies an automatic trimming on private values,
will affect the moments of the latter. In a standard econometric framework the trimming is usually
applied on the exogenous variables. See for instance, Lavergne and Vuong (1996) and Robinson
(1988).
In line with GPV (2000) our econometric model calls for a two step procedure. The first step
is similar to the first step in GPV (2000) in which we recover a sample of pseudo private values
while using a LPE. The second step departs from the fully nonparametric second step in GPV
(2000) since we use instead a GMM procedure to obtain an estimate for θ0. Thus our procedure is
semiparametric.
We establish the consistency and asymptotic normality of our semiparametric estimator. Specif-
ically, we show that our estimator converges uniformly at the parametric
√
L rate. As it is well
known, nonparametric estimators converge at a slower rate than
√
L and their rates are usually neg-
atively related to the dimension of the vector of exogenous variables. This makes these estimators
less desirable in applications, especially when a limited number of observations is available and/or
when the number of exogenous variables is relatively large.4 The estimator we propose in this pa-
per does not share this drawback since it is not subject to the so-called curse of dimensionality. In
other words, the convergence rate of our estimator is independent of the dimension of the exogenous
variables. A second major advantage of our estimation procedure is that it can be used to estimate
more general auction models. Indirect methods in general do not require neither the computation
of the equilibrium strategy nor of its inverse. Therefore these methods are specially convenient
when there is no closed form solution to the differential equation(s) characterizing the equilibrium
4Examples of semiparametric estimators attaining
√
L rate can be found in Newey and McFadden (1994) and
Powell (1994). Some notable exceptions are the estimators proposed by Manski (1985), Horowitz (1992), Kryriazidou
(1997) and Honoré and Kryriazidou (2000). An example of a semiparametric estimator converging at a slower than
the parametric rate but not subject to the curse of dimensionality, i.e. its rate is independent of d, is given by Campo,
Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2006).
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strategy as is the case in asymmetric auction models which lead to intractable expressions for the
first-order conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the theoretical model
from which the structural econometric model is derived as well as our semiparametric two-step
estimator. Section 3 establishes the asymptotic properties of our estimator and presents some
Monte Carlo experiments to illustrate the properties of our procedure in small samples and to
assess its advantages relative to a nonparametric procedure. Section 4 discusses how to extend our
procedure in a more general class of auction models. Section 5 concludes and indicates some future
lines of research. An appendix collects the proofs of our results.
2 The Model
2.1 The Symmetric IPV Model
We present the benchmark theoretical model underlying our structural econometric model, namely
the symmetric IPV model with a nonbinding reserve price. Although this model is somehow restric-
tive for applications, it allows us to develop in a more transparent way our econometric procedure.
We postpone until Section 4 possible extensions. A single and indivisible object is auctioned to I`
bidders who are assumed to be ex ante identical (i.e. the game is symmetric) and risk neutral. We
allow for the possibility that the total number of bidders varies across auctions as well. Unobserved
private values are denoted by V and more precisely we assume that each valuation Vp`, ` = 1, . . . , L,
p = 1, . . . , I`, is distributed according to F (·|Z`; θ0, γ0), where θ0 ∈ IRp is the parameter of interest
and γ0 could be in principle infinite or finite dimensional or even an empty set. The support of F (·|·)
is [V `, V `], with 0 ≤ V ` = V (Z`) < V ` = V (Z`) <∞. Among others, Riley and Samuelson (1981)
have characterized the unique symmetric differentiable Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In particular,
for every `, I` ≥ 2 the equilibrium bid Bp` in the `th auction is
Bp` = s0(Vp`, Z`) = Vp` − 1
F (Vp`|Z`; θ0, γ0)I`−1
∫ Vp`
v`
F (v|Z`; θ0, γ0)I`−1dv, (2)
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for any Vp` since p0 < v(Z`) subject to the boundary condition s(v`) = v`.
The distribution and density of observed bids in the `th auction is given by G(·|Z`; θ0, γ0) ≡
G0(·|Z`) and g(·|Z`; θ0, γ0) ≡ g0(·|Z`), respectively. Observed bids are assumed to be the equilibrium
outcome of the game. From GPV (2000), the observed bids and private values are related by the
following equilibrium expression
Vp` = ξ0(Bp`, Z`) = Bp` +
1
I` − 1
G0(Bp`|Z`)
g0(Bp`|Z`) , (3)
for ` = 1, . . . , L, p = 1, . . . , I`. Equation (3) constitutes the basis for the identification result in
GPV (2000), i.e. the authors show that the model is nonparametically identified.
2.2 The Two Step Estimator
In line with GPV (2000), equation (3) is the basis for our econometric model. The difference with
GPV (2000) is to model private values as a set of moment conditions. Therefore knowledge of G0(·|·)
and g0(·|·) would lead us to a GMM framework. However, these functions are unknown in practice
but can be easily estimated from observed bids. This suggests the following two-step procedure.
The first step is similar to the first step in GPV (2000) in which we recover a sample of pseudo
private values by using nonparametric local polynomial estimators. The second step departs from
the nonparametric second step of GPV (2000) since we use instead a GMM procedure to obtain
an estimator for θ0. Before presenting our two-step estimator, it is worth mentioning that some
of our assumptions are similar or even identical to those in GPV (2000). This is not surprising
since our methodology follows closely their methodology. In particular we follow GPV (2000) and
indicate when some modifications are necessary. Our first two assumptions deal with the underlying
data generating process and the smoothness of the latent joint distribution of (Vp`, Z`) for any
p = 1, . . . , I`.
Assumption A1:
(i) Z` = (X`, I`) ∈ IRd+1, ` = 1, 2, . . . are independently and identically distributed as Fm(·, ·)
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with density fm(·, ·).
(ii) For each `, Vp`, p = 1, . . . , I` are independently and identically distributed conditionally upon
Z` as F (·|·; θ0, γ0) with density f(·|·; θ0, γ0) where θ0 ∈ IRp and γ0 is potentially infinite, finite
or empty.
Let I be the set of possible values for I`. We denote by S(∗) the support of ∗ and by Si(∗) the
support when the number of bidders is equal to i.
Assumption A2: I is a bounded subset of {2, 3, . . .}, and:
(i) for each i ∈ I, Si(F ) = {(v, x) : x ∈ [x, x], v ∈ [v(x), v(x)]}, with x < x,
(ii) for (v, x, i) ∈ S(F ), f(v|x, i; θ0, γ0) ≥ cf > 0, and for (x, i) ∈ S(Fm), fm(x, i) ≥ cf > 0,
(iii) for each i ∈ I, F (·|·, i; θ0, γ0) and fm(·, i) admit up to R + 1 continuous bounded partial
derivatives on Si(F ) and Si(Fm), with R > d+ 1.
These assumptions can be found in GPV (2000) as well, though A2-(iii) is stronger in our case.
That is, we need to require R to be sufficiently large with respect to the dimension of X, i.e.
R > d + 1. This kind of condition is typically encountered in the semiparametric literature. Note
that Proposition 1 in GPV (2000) still holds under our assumption A2.
The next two assumptions are on kernels and bandwidths that we use in the first stage.
Assumption A3:
(i) The kernels KG(·), K1g(·) and K2g(·) are symmetric with bounded hypercube supports and
twice continuous bounded derivatives with respect to their arguments,
(ii)
∫
KG(x)dx = 1,
∫
K1g(x)dx = 1,
∫
K2g(b)db = 1
(iii) KG(·), K1g(·) and K2g(·) are of order R − 1. Thus moments of order strictly smaller than
R− 1 vanish.
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This is similar to assumption A3 in GPV (2000). It is a standard assumption in the nonpara-
metric literature.
Assumption A4: The bandwidths hG, h1g and h2g satisfy
(i) hG → 0 and Lh
d
G
logL
→∞, as L→∞,
(ii) h1g → 0, h2g → 0 and
Lhd1gh2g
logL
→∞, as L→∞.
As shown below, for consistency of our estimator it is possible to choose the optimal bandwidths
in the first step, i.e. the bandwidths proposed in Stone (1982). Unlike GPV (2000) we do not need
to specify a “boundary bandwidth” since the local polynomial method does not require knowledge of
the location of the endpoints of the support. Therefore, it is not necessary to estimate the boundary
of the support of the bid distribution. This is necessary when one needs to trim out observations,
which we do not given that our first step estimator is not subject to the so-called boundary effect.
For simplicity of presentation, in the rest of the paper we treat only univariate case for X, that
is d = 1.
In order to describe our two–step estimator, we observe first that, analogously to the first step
in GPV (2000), our objective is to estimate the ratio ψ(·|·) = G0(·|·)/g0(·|·) by ψˆ = Gˆ(·|·)/gˆ(·|·)
(see (3) above). We use a local polynomial estimator (LPE) for each function. From Proposition 1
in GPV (2000) we know that G0(·|·) is R+ 1 times continuously differentiable on its entire support
and therefore g0(·|·) is R times continuously differentiable on its entire support as well.5 Given the
smoothness of each function we propose to use a LPE(R), i.e. a LPE of degree R, for G0(·|·) and a
LPE(R− 1) for g0(·|·). We introduce first some notation.
Let Pρ(X;β) denote a polynomial of degree ρ in X with parameter β. Then for each each i we
5Observe that by Proposition 1 in GPV (2000) we also know that the conditional density g0(·|·) is R + 1 times
continuously differentiable on a closed subset of the interior of the support and thus the degree of smoothness closed
to the boundaries and at the boundaries of the support is not R+ 1.
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have
Gˆ(b|x) = arg min
βG
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
{
Y Gp` − PR(X` − x;βG)
}2 1
hG
KG
(
X` − x
hG
)
where Y Gp` = 1I(Bpl ≤ b), and
gˆ(b|x) = arg min
βg
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
{
Y gp` − PR−1(X` − x;βg)
}2 1
h1g
K1g
(
X` − x
h1g
)
where Y gp` =
1
h2g
K2g
(
Bp`−b
h2g
)
.
More precisely we have,
Gˆ(b|x, i) = 1
hG
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
eT1 (X
T
i,R+1W
G
x Xi,R+1)
−1
XR+1,`KG
(
X` − x
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ b)
=
1
LhG
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
eT1
(
XTi,R+1W
G
x Xi,R+1
ni
)−1
XR+1,`KG
(
X` − x
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ b)
(4)
and
gˆ(b|x, i) = 1
h1gh2g
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
eT1 (X
T
i,RW
g
xXi,R)
−1XR,`K1g
(
X` − x
h1g
)
K2g
(
Bp` − b
h2g
)
=
1
Lh1gh2g
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
eT1
(
XTi,RW
g
xXi,R
ni
)−1
XR,`K1g
(
X` − x
h1g
)
K2g
(
Bp` − b
h2g
)
(5)
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where for s = {R,R+ 1},
e1 is the unit vector in IRs containing a 1 in its first entry,
ni = iLi,
Li = #{` : I` = i},
Xs,` = [1 (X` − x) . . . (X` − x)s−1]T , is a s× 1 vector and,
Xi,s =

1 (X1 − x) . . . (X1 − x)s−1
...
...
...
...
1 (Xni − x) . . . (Xni − x)s−1

is the matrix of regressors of dimension ni × s with the first i rows identical and similarly for the
other rows,
WGx = diag
{
1
hG
KG
(
X`−x
hG
)}
,
W gx = diag
{
1
h1g
K1g
(
X`−x
h1g
)}
,
where KG(·), K1g(·) and K2g(·) are some kernels with bounded support and hG, h1g,h2g are some
bandwidths (see A3 and A4). Given (4) and (5), a natural way of recovering pseudo private values
is
Vˆp` = Bp` +
1
I` − 1 ψˆ(Bp`|Z`).
Unlike in GPV (2000), ψˆ is not subject to the so-called boundary effect, a typical problem
encountered in kernel estimation. Thus, as mentioned above, we do not need to trim out observations
that are “too close” to the boundary of the support of the joint distribution of (Bp`, Z`).
The second step of our estimation procedure is as follows. We propose to use the sample of
pseudo private values in the following conditional moment restrictions, namely
E[M(Vˆ , Z; θ0)|Z] ≈ 0,
for some known function M(·, ·; θ) : IR3 → IRq and θ ∈ IRp.
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This set of conditional moment restrictions translates into the following set of unconditional
moment restrictions,
E[m(Vˆ , Z; θ0)] ≈ 0, (6)
where m(·, ·; θ) : IR3 → IRq, θ ∈ Θ ⊂ IRp, with q ≥ p.
In view of (6), we propose to estimate θ0 by θˆ as follows
θˆ = arg min
θ∈Θ
SˆTL (θ)ΩSˆL(θ), (7)
where SˆL(θ) = 1/L
∑L
`=1 1/I`
∑I`
p=1m(Vˆp`, Z`; θ) and Ω is a positive definite matrix of order q.
Ideally, one would like to specify the following set of conditional moment restrictions
E[M(V,Z; θ0)|Z] = 0,
which would lead to the following unconditional moment restrictions
E[m(V,Z; θ0)] = 0.
Therefore, the infeasible estimator θ˜, (say), is the solution to
θ˜ = arg min
θ∈Θ
STL (θ)ΩSL(θ),
where SL(θ) = 1/L
∑L
`=1 1/I`
∑I`
p=1m(Vp`, Z`; θ).
As we show in the Appendix, the asymptotic distributions of θˆ and θ˜ are closely related though
not the same.
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3 Asymptotic Properties
In this section we show that our two-step semiparametric estimator θˆ of θ0 is consistent and asymp-
totically normal distributed. Moreover, we establish that our estimator attains the parametric
uniform rate of convergence given an appropriate choice of the bandwidths used in the first step
to estimate G0(·|·) and g0(·|·). As we will discuss below the optimal bandwidths, given by Stone
(1982), i.e. the one-step bandwidths, cannot be chosen, instead our choice implies that in practice
one needs to undersmooth.
We also discuss the assumptions under which our results hold.
3.1 Consistency
Our first result establishes that θˆ is a (strongly) consistent estimator for θ0. Moreover this is the
case even if one uses the optimal bandwidths for estimating G0(·|·) and g0(·|·) in the first step,
i.e. the bandwidths proposed by Stone (1982). To see this, we notice that the “optimal one-step”
bandwidths satisfy our assumption A4 above (with d = 1) since they are of the form,
(i) hG = λG
(
logL
L
)1/(2R+3)
(ii) h1g = λ1g
(
logL
L
)1/(2R+1)
and h2g = λ2g
(
logL
L
)1/(2R+1)
,
where λG, λ1g and λ2g are strictly positive constants.
As observed by GPV (2000), hG, h1g and h2g, as given above are optimal bandwidth choices to
estimate G0(·|·) and g0(·|·) given Proposition 1 and A2-(iii) in that paper.6 Thus, A4 implies that
our consistency result can be established when using LPE in the first stage that converge at the
best possible rate. The remaining assumptions are standard in the literature.
Assumption A5:
(i) The parameter space Θ ⊂ IRp is compact and θ0 is in the interior of Θ,
6As pointed out before, A2-(iii) in our case is stronger than A2-(iii) in GPV (2000). Thus their Proposition 1 also
holds in our framework.
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(ii) Identifying assumption: E[m(V,Z; θ)] = 0 if and only if θ = θ0,
(iii) sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m(Vp`, Z`; θ)‖ − E ‖m(V,Z; θ)‖
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = oas(1),
(iv) m(V,Z; θ) is Lipschitz in V : there exists a measurable function K1(Z) such that
∥∥m(V,Z; θ)−m(V ′, Z; θ)∥∥ ≤ K1(Z) ∣∣V − V ′∣∣ ,
for every V , V ′ ∈ [V , V ] and every θ ∈ Θ. Moreover E[K1(Z)] <∞.
We now state our consistency result.
Proposition 1: Let θˆ be defined as in (7). Then, under A1-A5, we have
θˆ
a.s−→ θ0.
Proposition 1 is important since it establishes that our estimator possess one of the desirable
asymptotic properties. This is the first step in order to be able to establish the asymptotic distri-
bution of the estimator. Moreover, there is no need to undersmooth the distribution and density
functions in the first step in order for θˆ to be consistent.
3.2 Asymptotic Normality
Given that θˆ is a (strongly) consistent estimator for θ0, we can now establish its asymptotic distri-
bution along with its uniform convergence rate. This is the purpose of Proposition 2 below. Before,
we introduce some additional assumptions.
We need to modify our choice of bandwidths as mentioned earlier. As it is well known, among
the typical properties encountered in semiparametric estimation, one usually finds that the optimal
bandwidth choice is excluded and in particular one needs to undersmooth.7 Our semiparametric
7Another typical property usually encountered has to do with a sufficiently large degree of smoothness relative to
the dimension of the exogenous variables, as reflected by A2-(iii).
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estimator is not an exception in this respect. Thus, as it is made clear by A4.AN below, in order
for θˆ to achieve the parametric uniform rate of convergence we need to specify bandwidths for our
first step that rule out the optimal choice and moreover that imply undersmoothed estimates for
Gˆ(·|·) and gˆ(·|·).
Assumption A4.AN: The bandwidths hG, h1g and h2g satisfy
(i)
√
LhR+1G → 0 and
logL√
LhG
→ 0, as L→∞
(ii)
√
LhR1g → 0,
√
LhR2g → 0 and
logL√
Lh1gh2g
→ 0, as L→∞.
(iii) h1g = h2g
The assumption that h1g and h2g vanish at the same rate, is to simplify the notation in the
proof. In fact it is enough to choose any pair of bandwidths strictly smaller than their optimal
counterparts.
Let mk(·) be the partial derivative of m(·) with respect to the kth argument. The next set of
assumptions is standard.
Assumption A6:
(i) m3(V,Z; θ) is Lipschitz in V : there exists a measurable function K3(Z) such that
∥∥m3(V,Z; θ)−m3(V ′, Z; θ)∥∥ ≤ K3(Z)|V − V ′|,
for every V , V ′ ∈ [V , V ] and θ ∈ Θ. Moreover E[K3(Z)] <∞,
(ii) m3(V,Z; θ) is Lipschitz in θ: there exists a measurable function K4(Z) such that
∥∥m3(V,Z; θ)−m3(V,Z; θ′)∥∥ ≤ K4(Z) ∥∥θ − θ′∥∥ ,
for every θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and V ∈ [V , V ]. Moreover E[K4(Z)] <∞,
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(iii) sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
m3(Vp`, Z`; θ)− E[m3(V,Z; θ)]
∥∥∥∥∥∥ = oas(1) and
E[m′3(V,Z; θ)]ΩE[m3(V,Z; θ)] is non singular,
(iv) sup
θ∈Θ
‖m3(V,Z; θ)‖ ≤ K5(V,Z) with E[K5(V,Z)] <∞,
(v) m1(V,Z; θ) is Lipschitz in V : there exists a measurable function K6(Z) such that
∥∥m1(V,Z; θ)−m1(V ′, Z; θ)∥∥ ≤ K6(Z)|V − V ′|,
for every V , V ′ ∈ [V , V ] and θ ∈ Θ. Moreover E[K6(Z)] <∞,
(vi) sup
θ∈Θ
‖m1(V,Z; θ)‖ ≤ K7(V,Z) with E[K7(V,Z)2] <∞.
Our last assumption concerns a technical condition we need for the proof of Proposition 2.
Our problem brings some technical difficulties that are not usually found in the semiparametric
literature. As a consequence, we need technical devices to get around some of these problems. This
is the purpose of Assumption A7.8
Assumption A7:
(i) Technical condition: E[m1(V,Z; θ0)] = 0.
To see what it entails, consider the following simple example. Let Z = X ∈ IR and E(V |Z) =
Zθ0. Then E(V −Zθ0|Z) = 0, and the unconditional moment restriction becomes E(Z(V −Zθ0)) =
0. Then the assumption satisfied whenever E(Z) = 0. Next, we establish our main result.
Proposition 2: Let θˆ be defined as in (7). Then, under A1-A3, A4.AN and A5-A7, we have
√
L(θˆ − θ0) d−→ N(0,Σ).
8Assumptions A7 basically implies that we can apply a Taylor expansion around h at h = 0 to a bias term we
need to deal with.
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where, for each i ∈ I
Σ = Var(ψ1),
ψ1 = −1/i
i∑
p=1
{
(CTΩC)−1CΩm(Vp1, X1, i; θ0) + 2
[∑
i
1
i(i− 1)N(Yp1, i)
f−1m (X1, i)g0(Yp1, i)− E
[∑
i
1
i(i− 1)N(Yp1, i)f
−1
m (X1, i)g0(Yp1, i)
]]}
,
C = E[∂m(V,X, i; θ0)/∂θ],
and
N(Yp1, i) = [m1(Vp1, X1, i; θ0)/g0(Bp1|X1, i)2]G0(Bp1|X1, i).
Proposition 2 is important for several reasons. First it establishes that our semiparametric
estimator has a standard limiting distribution. Asymptotic Normality is fundamental since most of
the econometric tests rely on it. Second, although slow estimators are used in the first step of our
estimation procedure to recover pseudo private values, the estimator of the parameter of interest
converges at the best possible rate. Third, our semiparametric estimator is not subject to the curse
of dimensionality. Finally, Proposition 2 can be used to conduct inference on θ0.
3.3 Monte Carlo Experiments
In this section we present the results of a set of Monte Carlo simulations in order to asses the
performance of our semiparametric estimator relative to the nonparametric estimator proposed in
GPV (2000). In line with the theoretical framework analyzed in the previous section we consider a
setup with observed object heterogeneity (d = 1). We use L = 200 with I = 5 bidders, which gives
a total of 1000 observed bids. The choice L = 200 corresponds to realistic size of auction data and
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makes the comparison with GPV (2000) easier since these authors also use this sample size although
they consider homogeneous auctions. In order to account for object heterogeneity, we generate X
from a log-normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1 truncated at 0.055 and 30 to satisfy
A2-(i). The true distribution F (·|Z; θ0, γ0) of private values is also lognormal. Moreover we have
that conditional on X, private values are log-normally distributed with mean 1 +X and variance 1.
We consider θ0 = (1, 1)T and γ0 = ∅. To satisfy assumption A2-(ii) we truncate this distribution at
0.055 and 30. We consider that this function has 4 continuous bounded partial derivatives, so that
R = 3. In line with assumption A3, we choose the triweight kernel (35/32)(1 − u2)31I(|u| ≤ 1) for
the three kernels involved in our first step estimators.
We choose the bandwidths according to A4.AN. In particular we use hG = 1.06σˆx(IL)−1/6.5,
h1g = 1.06σˆx(IL)
−1/4.5, h2g = 1.06σˆb(IL)−1/4.5,where σˆb and σˆx are the estimated standard de-
viations of observed bids and object heterogeneity, respectively. The factor 1.06 follows from the
so-called rule of thumb (see Hardle (1991)). The use of I arises because we have I bidders per
auction.9
We use 1000 replications. More precisely, for each replication we first generate randomly IL
private values using the truncated log–normal distribution. Next we compute the corresponding
bids Bp` using (2). With these observed bids we can now apply our estimation procedure for each
replication. First, we estimate the distribution and density functions of observed bids using (4) and
(5).
Next, we compute pseudo private values Vˆp` corresponding to Bp` as
Vˆp` = Bp` +
1
I − 1Gˆ(Bp`|Z`)/gˆ(Bp`|Z`)
for p = 1, . . . , 5 and ` = 1, . . . , L.
9To replicate the GPV (2000) estimator we choose the bandwidths according to the optimal rates. Thus, the order
of the bandwidths is L−1/9 for hG and the second step bandwidth hx and L−1/10 for hgb and hgx and the second step
bandwidths hfv and hfx. Specifically we use hG = 1.06σˆx(IL)−1/9, hgx = 1.06σˆx(IL)−1/10, hgb = 1.06σˆb(IL)−1/10
where σˆb and σˆx are as defined above. The second step bandwidths are hfv = 1.06σˆvˆ(nt)−1/10,hfx = 1.06σˆx(nt)−1/10
and hx = 1.06σˆx(L)−1/9, where nt is the number of observations remaining after trimming.
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In a second step we formulate the following (infeasible) moment condition
E
[
1I(V ≤ V ≤ V )∂ ln f(V |I,X; θ0)
∂θ
]
= 0.
Our feasible moment condition then becomes10
E
[
1I(V ≤ Vˆ ≤ V )∂ ln f(Vˆ |I,X; θ0)
∂θ
]
≈ 0.
Thus our sample moment condition can be expressed as follows
1
IL
L∑
`=1
I∑
p=1
1I(0.055 ≤ Vˆp` ≤ 30)∂ ln f(Vˆp`|I,X; θˆ)
∂θ
= 0.
Using the above condition we implement an efficient GMM procedure to obtain θˆ. We represent
our results for a fix value of X. In particular, we set X equal to its median. Figure 1 below shows
the true density of private values against the two estimators we are comparing. The semiparametric
estimator developed in this paper (dashed line) does a good job in matching the true density.
Moreover, when comparing with the nonparametric GPV (2000) estimator, we can see that our
semiparametric estimator is not subject to boundary effects.11
4 A More General Class of Models
In this Section we indicate how to extend our procedure to a more general class of auction models. To
keep the notation as simple as possible we consider models without observed object heterogeneity.
This is not restrictive since relaxing this assumption implies that the distribution and density
functions have to be replaced by their conditional counterparts.
10This moment condition does not satisfy Assumption A7-(i), but we still use it because it serves two purposes.
First, and as mentioned earlier, we are trying to use the same exercise as GPV(2000). Second, since even then the
estimator performs well (see below) it shows that the assumption is a strong sufficient condition, and the estimator
can perform well even when the condition is violated.
11The vertical lines in the figure correspond to the trimming we have conducted to which one hf is added (and
subtracted) to eliminate remaining boundary effects.
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Figure 1: Densities of bidders’ private values
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The first natural extension of the model considered in Section 2 is the symmetric IPV first-price
auction model with a binding reserve price, announced or random.
Announced Reserve Price
An announced binding reserve price (p0 > V ) constitutes a screening device for participating in
the auction. As pointed out by GPV (2000) the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy is still given by
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(2) in this set up, but the number I of potential bidders becomes unobserved and typically different
from the observed number, I∗, of actual bidders who have submitted a bid (≥ p0). Hence the model
has a new structural element, namely I, in addition to the latent distribution of bidders’ private
values. As shown in GPV (2000), the differential equation defining the equilibrium strategy can be
rewritten as
Vi = ξ0(Bi, G
∗
0, F (p0), I) = Bi +
1
I − 1
(
G∗0(Bi)
g∗0(Bi)
+
F (p0)
1− F (p0)
1
g∗0(Bi)
)
,
for i = 1, . . . , I∗ and where G∗0(·) is the truncated distribution of an observed bid conditional upon
the fact that the corresponding private value is grater than or equal to p0. Provided one can estimate
I and F (p0) this equation is the basis for a two step procedure analogous to that of Section 2.12
Random Reserve Price
In some cases, as in timber and wine auctions, the seller may decide not to announce the reserve
price at the time the auction takes place. Hence, the reserve price is said to be secret or random.
Since bidders do not know it when submitting their bids, this fact brings into the model a new
kind of uncertainty that has to be taken into account. To present the basic equation underlying
our two-step procedure in this model we need first to introduce additional notation. Let V0 be
the private value of the risk-neutral seller for the auctioned object. Moreover, we assume that V0
is distributed according to H(·) defined on the same support as F (·) and that H(·) is common
knowledge. Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) have shown that in a first-price sealed
bid auction p0 = V0. In addition the bidders’ equilibrium strategy is the solution of a differential
equation which in general cannot be solved explicitely. See Li and Perrigne (2003). However, this
differential equation can be rewritten as follows
Vi = ξ0(Bi, H,G0, I) = Bi +
1
(I − 1)
(
g0(Bi)
G0(Bi)
+ h(Bi)H(Bi)
) ,
12Introduction of heterogeneity across auctioned objects can be easily implemented if p0` is an unknown determin-
istic function of exogenous variables. See GPV (2000), Section 4 for further details.
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for i = 1, . . . , I. As mentioned by Perrigne and Vuong (1999) since the reserve price is kept secret,
all potential bidders submit a bid. Hence I is typically observed. The above equation can be used
as the basis of a two-step procedure similar to the one described in Section 2. Namely, in a first
step observed bids and reserve prices can be used to estimate nonparametrically the distribution
G0(·), its density g0(·) as well as the distribution H(·) and its density h(·). Next, pseudo private
values can be recovered using the equation above in order to define a set of moment conditions for
estimating the parameter of interest θ0 in a second step.
The Symmetric Affiliated Private Value (APV) Model
To assume independence across private value can be restrictive since one can expect some degree
of affiliation or positive correlation among private values. Thus, a second natural extension of our
framework is to consider the more general class of model encompassed by symmetric APV models.
Affiliation means that if one bidder draws a high valuation for the auctioned object, then others
bidders are likely to draw higher valuations too. Laffont and Vuong (1996) study the problem
of identification and theoretical restrictions in a general framework, namely in Affiliated Value
(AV) models. In particular they show that any symmetric AV model is observationally equivalent
to some symmetric APV model because the utility function is not identified from observed bids
only.13 Therefore when only data on observed bids are available the result in Laffont and Vuong
(1996) implies that APV models can be considered without loss of generality, provided that we have
identification.
We briefly indicate here how to adapt our estimation procedure to this kind of models. We
assume that all bids are observed and that the reserve price is nonbinding. Let Yi = maxj 6=i Vj .
The differential equation defining the equilibrium strategy in the APV model can be written as
follows
Vi = ξ0(Bi, G0) ≡ Bi +
G0,b1|B1(Bi|Bi)
g0,b1|B1(Bi|Bi)
,
13Two auction models are said to be observationally equivalent given observed bids, if they lead to the same
equilibrium bids distribution.
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for all Vi ∈ [V , V ] subject to the boundary condition s(V ) = V , whereG0,b1|B1(x1|X1) = FY1|V1(s−1(x1)),
B1 = s(Y1). This equation is again the basis for the identification result and estimation procedure.
The theoretical restrictions as shown by Li, Perrigne and Vuong (1999) indicate that the joint
distribution of bids G0(·) can be rationalized by a symmetric APV model if and only if (i) G0(·) is
symmetric and affiliated and (ii) the function ξ0(·, G0) is strictly increasing on its support. Moreover,
if these two conditions are satisfied, then the joint distribution F (·) of private values is identified.
Regarding estimation, the equation above suggests a two-step procedure analogous to the one
described in Section 2. In the first step the ratio Gb1|B1(·|·)/gb1|B1(·|·) can be estimated nonpara-
metrically and then pseudo private values can be recovered. In the second step a GMM procedure
can be implemented to estimate the parameter of interest of the underlying distribution of private
values.
Asymmetric Models
Assuming that bidders are ex ante identical may constitute a limitation. Therefore, in some cases
one needs to use models relaxing this assumption. However, a common feature share by asymmetric
auction models is that they lead to systems of differential equations without a closed form solution.
Hence, the direct approach becomes extremely difficult to implement. Nevertheless, using our
indirect two-step procedure, asymmetric models can be structurally estimated while avoiding solving
for the equilibrium strategy as well as of its inverse.
The Asymmetric IPV Model
Following the exposition in Perrigne and Vuong (2008) we assume that asymmetry is ex ante
known to all bidders. Let F1(·), . . . , FI(·) be the private value distributions of the I bidders whose
identities are observed and let G1(·), . . . , GI(·) be the corresponding bid distributions.14 We can
express the intractable system of differential equations as follows
Vi = Bi +
1∑
j 6=i
gj(Bi)
Gj(Bi)
14In the context of procurements, Flambard and Perrigne (2007) use an asymmetric model to analyze snow removal
contracts in Canada.
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for i = 1, . . . , I.
The above system of equations leads naturally to a two-step procedure similar to the one pro-
posed in Section 2.
The Asymmetric APV Model
For simplicity we consider only two types of bidders. That is, the model assumes that the I-
dimensional vector (V11, . . . , V1I1 , V01, . . . , V0I0) is distributed as F (·) which is exchangeable in its
first I1 and last I0 arguments. We can interprete this structure as follows. There is symmetry
within each subgroup as bidders of the same type are assumed to be ex ante identical. Even more,
since F (·) is affiliated, there is general positive dependence among private values. From Campo,
Perrigne and Vuong (1998) the system of differential equation defining equilibrium strategies is
V1 = ξ1(B1, G) ≡ B1 +
GB∗1 ,B0|B1(B1, B1|B1)
∂GB∗1 ,B0|B1(B1, B1|B1)/∂T
,
V0 = ξ0(B0, G) ≡ B0 +
GB1,B∗0 |B0(B0, B0|B0)
∂GB1,B∗0 |B0(B0, B0|B0)/∂T
,
where B∗j = maxi 6=1,i∈Gj Bji, Bj = maxi∈Gj Bji, for j = 1, 0 and the partial derivatives with respect
to T indicate the total derivative with respect to the first two arguments. Campo, Perrigne and
Vuong (1998) establish that F (·, . . . , ·) is identified. Moreover they use a nonparametric two-step
procedure following GPV (2000) to estimate the model. We propose instead to use our two-step
semiparametric procedure using the above system of equations to recover pseudo private values after
obtaining nonparametric estimates for GB∗1 ,B0|B1(·, ·|·) and GB1,B∗0 |B0(·, ·|·). Next in a second step
a model for the private values is specified through a set of moment conditions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we develop an indirect procedure to estimate first-price sealed-bid auction models,
contributing in this way to the structural analysis of auction data that has been developed in
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the last fifteen years. Following GPV (2000) our procedure is in two steps. The difference with
GPV (2000) is that our second step is implemented using a GMM procedure so that our resulting
model is semiparametric. We show that our semiparametric estimator converges uniformly at the
parametric
√
L rate while the nonparametric estimator in GPV (2000) was shown to converge at
the best possible rate according to the minimax theory which is slower than the parametric rate.
Moreover, our procedure is not subject to the so-called curse of dimensionality or in other words
the convergence rate is independent of the dimension of the exogenous variables. We establish
consistency and asymptotic normality of our estimator.
Given the nature of our procedure it is not necessary to solve explicitly for the equilibrium
strategy or its inverse. This is a valuable advantage with respect to direct methods specially when
estimating models that lead to intractable first-order conditions, such as asymmetric auction models.
More generally, our method extends to models which have been estimated using a nonparametric
indirect procedure. In this respect, we briefly outline how this can be done in models with a binding
reserve price (announced or random), affiliated private value models and asymmetric models.
Finally, we conducted a set of Monte Carlo simulations. The main purpose for this was to
asses the performance of our estimator in finite samples relative to the nonparametric estimator
proposed by GPV (2000). Our semiparametric estimator does a good job in matching the true
density. Moreover, when comparing with the nonparametric GPV (2000) estimator, we can see that
the estimator developed in this paper is not subject to boundary effects.
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Appendix
Proofs of Asymptotic Properties
This Appendix gives the proofs of our asymptotic results (Propositions 1 and 2).
We state first two important results.
Results: Under A4 we have,
(i) sup
(b,x,i)
|gˆ(b|x, i)− g0(b|x, i)| = Oas
(
hR1g + h
R
2g +
√
logL
Lh1gh2g
)
(ii) sup
(b,x,i)
∣∣∣Gˆ(b|x, i)−G0(b|x, i)∣∣∣ = Oas(hR+1G +√ logLLhG
)
For a proof of the above results we refer the reader to Korostelev and Tsybakov (1993).
We observe that the above results imply that sup
p`
|Vˆp` − Vp`| = oas(1).
Proof of Proposition 1: It suffices to show that sup
θ∈Θ
‖ SL(θ)− SˆL(θ) ‖ = oas(1). From the triangle
inequality, A5-(iv) it follows that
sup
θ∈Θ
‖SL(θ)− SˆL(θ)‖ = sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
m(Vp`, Z`; θ)− 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
m(Vˆp`, Z`; θ)
∥∥∥∥∥
= sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[m(Vp`, Z`; θ)−m(Vˆp`, Z`; θ)]
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥m(Vp`, Z`; θ)−m(Vˆp`, Z`; θ)∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K1(Z`)|Vˆp` − Vp`|
= {E[K1(Z)] + oas(1)} sup
p`
|Vˆp` − Vp`|
= oas(1) (A.1)
Where we use the fact that Vˆp` is a consistent estimator of Vp`, i.e. we make use of the 2 results stated
at the beginning of this Appendix. Therefore, the desired result follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
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From the FOCs that characterize θ˜ and θˆ respectively, we have
1
2
∂QL
∂θ
(θ˜) =
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)ΩSL(θ˜) = 0 (A.2)
1
2
∂QˆL
∂θ
(θˆ) =
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)ΩSˆL(θˆ) = 0. (A.3)
We can use a Taylor expansion around θ0 to obtain
SL(θ˜) = SL(θ0) +
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)(θ˜ − θ0) (A.4)
SˆL(θˆ) = SˆL(θ0) +
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θ
∗
)(θˆ − θ0), (A.5)
where θ and θ
∗
are vectors between θ˜ and θ0, and θˆ and θ0, respectively.
Thus using (A.4) in (A.2) we get
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
[
SL(θ0) +
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)(θ˜ − θ0)
]
=
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)ΩSL(θ0) +
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)(θ˜ − θ0) = 0.
Therefore, we have
√
L(θ˜ − θ0) = −
[
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)
]−1
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
√
LSL(θ0)
= −A˜−1B˜
√
LSL(θ0).
Similarly using (A.5) in (A.3) yields
√
L(θˆ − θ0) = −
[
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θ
∗
)
]−1
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
√
LSˆL(θ0)
= −Aˆ−1Bˆ
√
LSˆL(θ0).
we need to show: (i) B˜ − Bˆ = oas(1), (ii) A˜− Aˆ = oas(1) since this and A6-(iii) imply that the difference of
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the inverses is also oas(1) and (iii)
√
L[SL(θ0)− SˆL(θ0)] = Op(1).
The proof consists of three steps. Step 1: We prove B˜− Bˆ = oas(1). The term B˜− Bˆ can be written as
B˜ − Bˆ = ∂S
T
L
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω− ∂Sˆ
T
L
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
=
(
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)− ∂Sˆ
T
L
∂θ
(θˆ)
)
Ω
=
(
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
(
mT3 (Vp`, Z`, θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ)
))
Ω.
It suffices to show that the norm of the term between brackets is oas(1) since Ω is a positive definite
matrix. Namely
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
mT3 (Vp`, Z`, θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ))
∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[
(mT3 (Vp`, Z`, θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θ˜)) +mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ))
]∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[
(mT3 (Vp`, Z`; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θ˜))
]∥∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ))
∥∥∥∥∥
= C +D, (A.6)
where the last line follows from the triangle inequality. The term C is
C =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[
(mT3 (Vp`, Z`; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θ˜))
]∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
∥∥∥[mT3 (Vp`, Z`; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θ˜)]∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K3(Z`)|Vp` − Vˆp`|
≤ {E[K3(Z)] + oas(1)} sup
p`
|Vˆp` − Vp`|
= oas(1)
where we use A6-(i) and the fact that Vˆp` is uniformly consistent, i.e., we use the two results stated at the
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beginning of this Appendix.
We consider now the term D
D =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[
mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ)
]∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
∥∥∥mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θ˜)−mT3 (Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ)∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K4(Z`)‖θ˜ − θˆ‖
= {E[K4(Z)] + oas(1)}oas(1)
where we have used A6-(ii) and the fact that θ˜ and θˆ are consistent estimators for θ0.
Step 2: We prove A˜− Aˆ = oas(1). The term A˜− Aˆ is
A˜− Aˆ =
(
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
∂SL
∂θT
(θ)
)
−
(
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θ
∗
)
)
=
[
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
(
∂SL
∂θT
(θ˜) + oas(1)
)]
−
[
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
(
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ) + oas(1)
)]
=
(
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)Ω
∂SL
∂θT
(θ˜)
)
−
(
∂SˆTL
∂θ
(θˆ)Ω
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ)
)
+ oas(1)
=
[(
∂STL
∂θ
(θ˜)− ∂Sˆ
T
L
∂θ
(θˆ)
)
Ω
](
∂SL
∂θT
(θ˜) +
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ)
)
. (A.7)
where the second equality comes from the following
∥∥∥∥∂SL∂θT (θ)− ∂SL∂θT (θ˜)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m3(Vp`, Z`; θ)−m3(Vp`, Z`; θ˜)‖
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K4(Z`)‖θ − θ˜‖
= {E[K4(Z)] + oas(1)}oas(1)
= oas(1)
where we use A6-(ii), the fact that θ˜ ≤ θ ≤ θ0 and that θ˜ a.s−→ θ0. A similar argument can be used to show
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that
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θ
∗
) =
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ) + oas(1),
since θˆ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ0 and θˆ a.s−→ θ0.
Now, for the last line in (A.7) we observe that by Step 1, the first factor in (A.7) is oas(1) and the second
factor can be expressed as follows
∥∥∥∥∥
(
∂SL
∂θT
(θ˜) +
∂SˆL
∂θT
(θˆ)
)∥∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[m3(Vp`, Z`; θ˜) +m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ)]
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖[m3(Vp`, Z`; θ˜) +m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ)]‖
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m3(Vp`, Z`; θ˜)‖+ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ)‖
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
sup
θ∈Θ
‖m3(Vp`, Z`; θ)‖+ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ)−m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θ0)
+m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θ0)‖
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K5(Vp`, Z`) +
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θˆ)−m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θ0)‖
+
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θ0)−m3(Vp`, Z`; θ0) +m3(Vp`, Z`; θ0)‖
≤ {E[K5(V,Z)] + oas(1)}+ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K4(Z`)‖θˆ − θ0‖
+
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m3(Vˆp`, Z`; θ0)−m3(Vp`, Z`; θ0)‖+ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m3(Vp`, Z`; θ0)‖
≤ {E[K5(V,Z)] + oas(1)}+ {E[K4(Z)] + oas(1)}oas(1) + 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K3(Z`)|Vˆp` − Vp`|
+
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
sup
θ∈Θ
‖m3(Vp`, Z`; θ)‖
≤ {E[K5(V,Z)] + oas(1)}+ {E[K4(Z)] + oas(1)}oas(1) + {E[K3(Z)] + oas(1)} sup
p`
|Vˆp` − Vp`|
+{E[K5(V,Z)] + oas(1)}
= 2{E[K5(V,Z)] + oas(1)} <∞
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where we use A6-(ii),(iv),(v) and the two results stated at the beginning of this Appendix.
Therefore the second factor in the last line of (A.7) converges to a finite limit and since the first factor
is oas(1) the desired result follows.
Step 3: We prove
√
L(SL(θ0)− SˆL(θ0)) = Op(1).
The term
√
L(SL(θ0)− SˆL(θ0)) is
B =
√
L(SL(θ0)− SˆL(θ0)) =
√
L
(
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
m(Vp`, Z`; θ0)− 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
m(Vˆp`, Z`; θ0)
)
=
√
L
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[
m(Vp`, Z`; θ0)−m(Vˆp`, Z`; θ0)
]
We prove
B =
√
L
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[
m(Vp`, Z`; θ0)−m(Vˆp`, Z`; θ0)
]
= Op(1) + oas(1).
The above expression can be rewritten as
B = −
√
L
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[
m1(Vp`, Z`; θ0)(Vˆp` − Vp`)
]
+
√
L
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
[
m1(Vp`, Z`; θ0)−m1(V ∗p`, Z`; θ0)
]
(Vˆp` − Vp`)
= B1 +B2, (A.8)
where the second equality comes from a Taylor expansion of order one and the following
m(Vp`, Z`; θ0)−m(Vˆp`, Z`; θ0)
= m1(V
∗
p`, Z`; θ0)(Vp` − Vˆp`)
= m1(Vp`, Z`; θ0)(Vˆp` − Vp`) +m1(V ∗p`, Z`; θ0)(Vp` − Vˆp`)−m1(Vp`, Z`; θ0)(Vˆp` − Vp`)
= −m1(Vp`, Z`; θ0)(Vˆp` − Vp`) + [m1(Vp`, Z`; θ0)−m1(V ∗p`, Z`; θ0)](Vˆp` − Vp`)
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Step 3.1: We consider B1 in (A.8) and moreover we observe that for each i we can write
‖B1‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥√L 1L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)(Vˆp` − Vp`)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥√L 1L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
1
i− 1
[
Gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i) −
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
]∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥√L 1L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
{
Gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) −
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g20(Bp`|X`,i)
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i) + G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
1
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)− g0(Bp`|X`, i)
]2
− 1
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
Gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
]
[gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)− g0(Bp`|X`, i)]
}∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥√L 1L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
[
Gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i) −
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g20(Bp`|X`,i)
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)
]∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥√L 1L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)(
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
1
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)g0(Bp`|X`, i) [gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)− g0(Bp`|X`, i)]
2
− 1
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
Gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
]
[
gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)− g0(Bp`|X`, i)
])∥∥∥∥∥
= ‖B11‖+ ‖B12‖ (A.9)
where the third line uses the following identity
a˜
b˜
− a
b
=
a˜− ab b˜
b
+
a
b
1
b˜b
[b˜− b]2 − 1
b˜b
[a˜− a][b˜− b].
The term B11 can be written as
B11 =
√
L
1
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
 Gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)− G0(Bp`|X`,i)g0(Bp`|X`,i) gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)

=
√
L(RL +
L(L− 1)
L2
UL)
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= B111 +B112, (A.10)
where
RL =
1
L2
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(0)1I(Bp` ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (0)K2g,hg (0)
]
,
UL =
1
L(L− 1)
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
L∑
{j:Ij=i,j 6=`}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
i∑
q=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −X`)1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (Xj −X`)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bp`)
]
.
To see how to obtain the last line in (A.10), we observe that the term within brackets in the first line of
(A.10) can be expressed as
Gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)− G0(Bp`|X`,i)g0(Bp`|X`,i) gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) =
=
1
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
Gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)− G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) gˆ(Bp`|X`, i)
]
=
1
g0(Bp`|X`, i)[
1
LhG
L
ni
L∑
{j:Ij=i}
i∑
q=1
eT1
(
XTi,R+1W
G
x Xi,R+1
ni
)−1
XR+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
1
Lh2g
L
ni
L∑
{j:Ij=i}
i∑
q=1
eT1
(
XTi,RW
g
xXi,R
ni
)−1
XR,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)]
=
1
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
1
L
L
ni
L∑
{j:Ij=i}
i∑
q=1
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −X`)1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)−
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
1
L
L
ni
L∑
{j:Ij=i}
i∑
q=1
ωgi,R,jK1g,hg (Xj −X`)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bp`)
]
(A.11)
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where we have used the following notations
KG,hG(Xj −X`) =
1
hG
KG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
, (A.12)
K1g,hg (Xj −X`) =
1
hg
K1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
, (A.13)
K2g,hg (Bqj −Bp`) =
1
hg
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
, (A.14)
ωGi,R+1,j = e
T
1
(
XTi,R+1W
G
x Xi,R+1
ni
)−1
XR+1,j , (A.15)
ωgi,R,j = e
T
1
(
XTi,RW
g
xXi,R
ni
)−1
XR,j , (A.16)
Now using (A.11) in the first line of (A.10), we get
B11 =
√
L
(
1
L2
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
L∑
{j:Ij=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
i∑
q=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −X`)1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (Xj −X`)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bp`)
])
. (A.17)
The term between parenthesis in (A.17) can be decomposed as follows. Namely,
1) Diagonal terms (` = j, p = q)
RL =
1
L2
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(0)1I(Bp` ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (0)K2g,hg (0)
]
, (A.18)
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2) Off-diagonal terms (` 6= j)
L(L− 1)
L2
UL =
1
L2
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
L∑
{j:Ij=i,j 6=`}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
i∑
q=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −X`)1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (Xj −X`)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bp`)
]
. (A.19)
From (A.18) and (A.19) we have the expression in the last line of (A.10). It remains to show that
B11 = B111 +B112 = oas(1). We consider first B111 =
√
LRL in (A.10). Specifically,
B111 =
√
L‖RL‖ =
√
L
∥∥∥∥∥
(
1
L2
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(0)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (0)K2g,hg (0)
])∥∥∥∥∥
=
√
L
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L Lni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
ωGi,R+1,j
KG,hG(0)
L
− G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
ωgi,R,j
K1g,hg (0)K2g,hg (0)
L
]∥∥∥∥∥
≤
 1
L
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
‖m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)‖2
 12
√
L
(
1
L
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
1
g0(Bp`|X`, i)2
[
ωGi,R+1,j
KG,hG(0)
L
− G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
ωgi,R,j
K1g,hg (0)K2g,hg (0)
L
]2) 12
= CD,
where the inequality comes from Cauchy-Schwartz. First we show that C2 < ∞. Using A6-(vi), 0 <
(1/(i− 1)) < 1 for each i ∈ I and L/ni = L/(iLi) <∞ we get
C2 =
1
L
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
‖m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)‖2
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≤ L
ni
1
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
1
i(i− 1) supθ∈Θ ‖m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ)‖
2
<
1
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
K7(Vp`, X`, i)
2
= E[K7(V,X, i)
2] + oas(1) <∞.
It remains to consider the D term above. Namely,
D ≤
√
L
(
1
L
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
1
g0(Bp`|X`, i)2
[
ωGi,R+1,j
KG(0)
LhG
− G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
ωgi,R,j
K1g,hg (0)K2g,hg (0)
Lh2g
]2) 12
=
√
L
(
1
L
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
1
g0(Bp`|X`, i)2
[
Op(1)Op
(
1
LhG
)
− G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
Op(1)Op
(
1
Lh2g
)]2) 12
<
√
Lκ1
[
Op
(
1
LhG
)
− κ2Op
(
1
Lh2g
)]
= κ1
[
Op
(
1√
LhG
)
− κ2Op
(
1√
Lh2g
)]
= κ1[op(1)− κ2op(1)]
= op(1),
where after the first equality we use (A.12)- (A.16). The second line follows from observing that
ωGi,R+1,j = e
T
1
(
XTi,R+1W
G
x Xi,R+1
ni
)−1
XR+1,j
= eT1
[
1
nihG
ni∑
s=1
xTs xsKG
(
xs − xj
hg
)]−1
e1
= Op(1)
and similarly for ωgi,R,j .
The third line uses the fact that densities are bounded away from zero and 0 < (1/i(i − 1)) < 1 for all
i. The last line follows from Assumption A4.AN. Thus, B111 = CD = o(1) as desired.
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Let Yp` = (Bp`, X`) and for each i define ,
rL(Yp`, i) = E[pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))|(Yp`, i)], where pL(·, ·) is a symmetric function,
θL = E[rL(Yp`, i)] = E[pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))],
UˆL = θL +
2
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
[rL(Yp`, i)− θL].
Next, we consider B112 in (A.10)
B112 =
L(L− 1)
L2
√
LUL
=
L(L− 1)
L2
√
L(UL − UˆL) + L(L− 1)
L2
√
LUˆL
= B1121 +B1122, (A.20)
where UL can be written as a U-statistic. Namely,
UL =
1
L(L− 1)
L
ni
L∑
{`:I`=i}
L∑
{j:Ij=i,j 6=`}
1
i(i− 1)
i∑
p=1
i∑
q=1
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −X`)1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (Xj −X`)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bp`)
]
=
1
L(L− 1)
L−1∑
{`:I`=i}
L∑
{j:Ij=i,j=`+1}
1
i
i∑
p=1
i∑
q=1
{
L
ni(i− 1)
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −X`)1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (Xj −X`)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bp`)
]}
=
2
L(L− 1)
L−1∑
{`:I`=i}
L∑
{j:Ij=i,j=`+1}
1
i
i∑
p=1
i∑
q=1
[
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)K
∗∗(Bp`, Bqj , X`, Xj , i)
2
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)K
∗∗(Bqj , Bp`, Xj , X`, i)
2
]
=
 L
2
−1 L−1∑
{`:I`=i}
L∑
{j:Ij=i,j=`+1}
1
i
i∑
p=1
i∑
q=1
pL ((Bp`, X`, i), (Bqj , Xj , i)) .
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We prove B1121 =
√
L(UL − UˆL) = op(1). By Lemma 3.1 in Powell, Stock and Stoker (1989) it suffices
to show that E[‖pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))‖2] = o(L). We will show that E[‖pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))‖2|i] = o(L) since
it implies the aforementioned condition.
E[‖pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))‖2|i] =
∫
‖pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))‖2g0(Yp`|i)g0(Yqj |i)dYp`dYqj
=
1
4
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥ Lni(i− 1) m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
1
hG
ωGi,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
1
h2g
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)]
+
L
ni(i− 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
[
1
hG
ωGi,R+1,jKG
(
X` −Xj
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
−G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
1
h2g
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Yp`|i)g0(Yqj |i)dYp`dYqj
=
1
4
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥
[
L
ni(i− 1)
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
1
hG
ωGi,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
+
L
ni(i− 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
1
hG
ωGi,R+1,jKG
(
X` −Xj
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
]
+
[
L
ni(i− 1)
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
1
h2g
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
+
L
ni(i− 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
1
h2g
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Yp`|i)g0(Yqj |i)dYp`dYqj
=
1
4
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥ 1hG Lni
[
1
(i− 1)
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
+
1
(i− 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
X` −Xj
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
]
+
1
h2g
L
ni
[
1
(i− 1)
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
+
1
i− 1
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Yp`|i)g0(Yqj |i)dYp`dYqj
≤ 1
2
∫ {∥∥∥∥∥ Lni 1hG
[
1
(i− 1)
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
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+
1
(i− 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
X` −Xj
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
]∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥ Lni 1h2g
[
1
(i− 1)
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
+
1
(i− 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2}
g0(Yp`|i)g0(Yqj |i)dYp`dYqj
= C +D (A.21)
where the inequality comes from using (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2). Therefore we need to show that both C and D
are o(L).
We consider first the C term in (A.21), and note that we can write Vp` = ξ(Bp`, X`, i). It gives
C =
1
2h2G
∫ (
L
ni
1
(i− 1)
)2 ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(Bp`, X`, i), X`, i; θ0)g0(Bp`|X`, i) ωGi,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
X` −Xj
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Yp`|i)g0(Yqj |i)dYp`dYqj
=
1
2
∫ (
L
ni
1
(i− 1)
)2 ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , i) ωGi,R+1,jKG(−u2)
1I(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj) + m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(u2)1I(u1hG +Bqj ≤ Bqj)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(uhG + Yqj |i)g0(Yqj |i)dudYqj
≤
∫ [∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , i) ωGi,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ωGi,R+1,jKG(u2)1I(u1hG +Bqj ≤ Bqj)
∥∥∥∥2
]
g0(uhG + Yqj |i)g0(Yqj |i)dudYqj
= C1 + C2,
where we have used the change of variable
u =
Yp` − Yqj
hG
=
(
Bp` −Bqj
hG
,
X` −Xj
hG
)
= (u1, u2),
and the inequality comes from using (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2) and
(
L
ni
1
(i−1)
)2
<∞.
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Next we consider C1
C1 =
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , i) ωGi,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(uhG + Yqj |i)g0(Yqj |i)dudYqj
=
∫ ∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , i)
∥∥∥∥2 ∥∥ωGi,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)∥∥2
g0(uhG + Yqj |i)g0(Yqj |i)dudYqj
=
∫
‖m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)‖2
∥∥ωGi,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)∥∥2
g0(uhG + Yqj |i)g(Yqj |i)
g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , i)2 dudYqj
≤
∫
‖m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)‖2
∥∥ωGi,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)∥∥2
g0(Yqj |i)dudYqj ,
where the last inequality comes from the assumption that densities are bounded.
By the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence (LDC) Theorem and A6-(vi), the above integral converges to
∫
‖Op(1)KG(−u2)‖2 du
∫
‖m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)‖2g0(Yqj |i)dYqj <∞.
Hence, C1 = o(L) as L→∞
A similar argument can be used to show that C2 = o(L) as L→∞. Therefore, C = C1 + C2 = o(L).
Next we consider the D term in (A.21). Namely
D =
1
2
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥ Lni 1h2g
[
1
(i− 1)
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
+
1
(i− 1)
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
g
i,R,j
K1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)]∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(Yp`|i)g0(Yqj |i)dYp`dYqj
=
1
2h4g
(
L
ni
1
(i− 1)
)2 ∫ ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(Bp`, X`, i), X`, i; θ0)g0(Bp`|X`, i) G0(Bp`|X`, i)g0(Bp`|X`, i) ωgi,R,j
K1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
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g0(Yp`|i)g0(Yqj |i)dYp`dYqj
≤ 1
2h2g
∫ ∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , i) G0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , i)g0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , i)
ωgi,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
g0(uhg + Yqj |i)g0(Yqj |i)dudYqj
≤ 1
h2g
∫ [∥∥∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)g0(u1hG +Bqj |u2hG +Xj , i) G0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , i)g0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , i) ωgi,R,j
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , i) G0(Bqj |Xj , i)g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ωgi,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1)
∥∥∥∥2
]
g0(uhg + Yqj |i)g0(Yqj |i)dudYqj
= D1 +D2,
where we have used the change of variable
u =
Yp` − Yqj
hg
=
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
,
X` −Xj
hg
)
= (u1, u2),
the first inequality comes from the fact that
(
L
ni
1
(i−1)
)2
< ∞, and the second inequality comes from using
(a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2).
We consider first D1. Specifically,
D1 =
1
h2g
∫ ∥∥∥m1(ξ(uhg + Yqj , i), u2hg +Xj , i; θ0)G0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , i)∥∥∥2∥∥∥ωgi,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)∥∥∥2 g0(uhg + Yqj |i)g0(Yqj |i)g0(u1hg +Bqj |u2hg +Xj , i)4 dudYqj
≤ 1
h2g
∫
‖m1(ξ(uhg + Yqj , i), u2hg +Xj , i; θ0)‖2
∥∥∥ωgi,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)∥∥∥2
g0(Yqj |i)dudYqj
where the inequality uses the fact that G(·|·, i) is bounded and that densities are bounded from above.
By the LDC Theorem and A6-(vi) the above integral converges to
∫
‖Op(1)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)‖2 du
∫
‖m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)‖2 g0(Yqj |i)dYqj <∞.
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Hence, D1 = o(L) if and only if Lh2g →∞ as implied by A4.AN-(ii) since
Lh2g =
√
L
√
Lh2g →∞.
A similar argument can be used to show that D2 = o(L). That is, D2 = o(L) if and only if Lh2g → ∞,
as implied by A4.AN-(ii).
Therefore, C+D = C1 +C2 +D1 +D2 = o(L) and the desired result follows, i.e by Lemma 3.1 in Powell,
Stock and Stoker (1989)
√
L(UL − UˆL) = op(1).
Next we consider the second term in (A.20)
B1122 =
L(L− 1)
L2
√
LUˆL
=
L(L− 1)
L2
√
L
θL + 2L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
[rL(Yp`, i)− θL]

=
L(L− 1)
L2
√
LE[pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))] +
L(L− 1)
L2
√
L
2
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
[rL(Yp`, i)− θL].
By the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), the second term above is Op(1) (See Lemma A1 below). Therefore,
it remains to show that the first term is oas(1). We consider the expectation in the first term above. Namely
E[pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))]
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫ {
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(Xj −X`)1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
−G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (Xj −X`)K2g,hg (Bqj −Bp`)
]
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
[
ωGi,R+1,jKG,hG(X` −Xj)1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
−G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (X` −Xj)K2g,hg (Bp` −Bqj)
]}
g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
1
hG
[
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
X` −Xj
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
]
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g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
−1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
1
h2g
[
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)]
g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
= A1 −A2. (A.22)
We consider first A1.
‖A1‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥12 Lni∑i 1(i− 1)
∫
1
hG
[
m1(ξ(Bp`, X`, i), X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`) + m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
X` −Xj
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
]
g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ ‖A11‖+ ‖A12‖
It is enough to show that ‖A11‖ = oas(1/
√
L) since the same argument can be used to show that
‖A12‖ = oas(1/
√
L). We observe the following
‖A11‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥12 Lni∑i 1(i− 1)
∫
1
hG
[
m1(ξ(Bp`, X`, i), X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
]
g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
∫
1
hG
m1(ξ(Bp`, X`, i), X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
∫
1
hG
m1(ξ(Bp`, X`, i), X`, i; θ0)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
g0(Bp`, X`, i)dYp`dYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
= hG
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
∫
m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(−u2)
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1I(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)g0(uhG + Yqj , i)dudYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ hG
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
∫
m1(ξ(uhG + Yqj , i), u2hG +Xj , i; θ0)KG(−u2)
1I(Bqj ≤ u1hG +Bqj)g0(uhG + Yqj , i)dudYqj
∥∥∥∥∥ (A.23)
where we have used the fact that densities are bounded and the change of variable
u =
Yp` − Yqj
hG
=
(
Bp` −Bqj
hG
,
X` −Xj
hG
)
= (u1, u2). The last inequality comes from observing that ωGi,R+1,j =
Op(1).
We consider now the expectation inside the norm of the term above evaluated at hG = 0, namely
∑
i
∫
m1(ξ(Yqj , i), Xj , i; θ0)g0(Yqj , i)dYqj
=
∑
i
∫ [∫
m1(ξ(Yqj , i), Xj , i; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , i)dBqj
]
fm(Xj , i)dXj
= E[m1(V,X, i; θ0)]
where we use A3-(ii) and the Law of Iterated Expectations. The last line in the expression above follows
from observing that the integral inside can be solved by using twice integration by parts as follows
∫ B(Xj ,i)
B(Xj)
m1(ξ(Bqj , Xj , i), Xj , i; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , i)dBqj
= m1(ξ(B(Xj , i), Xj , i), Xj , i; θ0)G0(B(Xj , i)|Xj , i)−m1(ξ(B(Xj), Xj , i), Xj , i; θ0)
G0(B(Xj)|Xj , i)−
∫ B(Xj ,i)
B(Xj)
m11(ξ(Bqj , Xj , i), Xj , i; θ0)G0(Bqj |Xj , i)dBqj
= m1(V ,Xj , i; θ0)−
∫ B(Xj ,i)
B(Xj)
m11(ξ(Bqj , Xj , i), Xj , i; θ0)G0(Bqj |Xj , i)dBqj
= m1(V ,Xj , i; θ0)−m1(ξ(B(Xj , i), Xj , i), Xj , i; θ0)G0(B(Xj , i)|Xj , i)
+m1(ξ(B(Xj), Xj , i), Zj ; θ0)G0(B(Xj)|Xj , i)
+
∫ B(Xj ,i)
B(Xj)
m1(ξ(Bqj , Xj , i), Xj , i; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , i)dBqj
= m1(V ,Xj , i; θ0)−m1(V ,Xj , i; θ0)
+
∫ B(Xj ,i)
B(Xj)
m1(ξ(Bqj , Xj , i), Xj , i; θ0)g0(Bqj |Xj , i)dBqj
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=∫ V (Xj ,i)
V (Xj ,i)
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
ξ1(Bqj , Xj , i)
dVqj
= E[m1(V,X, i; θ0)|X, i]
where the fifth equality usesG0(Bqj |Xj , i) = F (ξ(Bqj , Xj , i)|Xj , i), so that g0(Bqj |Xj , i) = f(Vqj |Xj , i)ξ1(Bqj , Xj , i).
Therefore at hG = 0 the integral inside the norm in (A.23) vanishes by A7-(i). Thus, we can apply a
Taylor expansion of order R+ 1 in the RHS of (A.23) around hG to obtain
‖A11‖ ≤ hG
∑
i
∥∥∥∥d1hG + d2h2G2 + . . .+ dR hRGR! +O(hR+1G )
∥∥∥∥
=
∑
i
∥∥∥∥∥d1h2G + d2h3G2 + . . .+ dR hR+1GR! +O(hR+2G )
∥∥∥∥∥
We note that the remainder term vanishes, i.e.
√
LhR+2G = o(1), and also that
√
LhR+1G = o(1), by
A4.AN-(i). The remaining R − 1 terms also vanish by A3-(iii), i.e, since the kernels are of order R − 1. To
see this observe that the kth coordinate of dρ, ρ = 1, . . . , R− 1 is
dkρ =
∂ρ
∂hρG
∫
[Hk(uhG + Y )−Hk(uhG + Y )]KG(−u2)du|hG=0
=
2∑
k1,...,kρ=1
∫
(uk1 . . . ukρ)KG(−u2)
∂ρ
∂Yk1 . . . ∂Ykρ
Hk(Y )du
−
2∑
k1,...,kρ=1
∫
(uk1 . . . ukρ)KG(−u2)
∂ρ
∂Yk1 . . . ∂Ykρ
Hk(Y )du
= 0,
where dHk/dY (y) = m1,k(ξ(y, i), x, i; θ0)g0(y, i). The third equality uses A3-(iii), that is since KG(·) is a
higher order kernel, all moments of order strictly smaller than R− 1 vanish.
It remains to consider now A2 in (A.22). Namely
‖A2‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥12 Lni∑i 1(i− 1)
∫
1
h2g
[
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)]
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g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ ‖A21‖+ ‖A21‖
We show only that A21 = oas(1/
√
L) since a similar argument can be used to show that A22 = oas(1/
√
L).
We observe the following
‖A21‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥12 Lni∑i 1(i− 1)
∫
1
h2g
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
∫
1
h2g
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i) ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
∫
1
h2g
m1(ξ(Bp`, X`, i), X`, i; θ0)ω
g
i,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
g0(Bp`, X`, i)g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYp`dYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
∫
m1(ξ(uhg + Yqj , i), u2 +Xj , i; θ0)ω
g
i,R,jK1g,hg (−u2)K2g,hg (−u1)
g0(uhg + Yqj , i)dudYqj
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
∫
m1(ξ(uhg + Yqj , i), u2 +Xj , i; θ0)K1g,hg (−u2)K2g,hg (−u1)
g0(uhg + Yqj , i)dudYqj
∥∥∥∥∥,
where we have used that (1/2)(L/ni)1/(i−1) ≤ ∞ and also that densities are bounded. The last equality uses
the change of variable u = (Yp` − Yqj)/hg and the last inequality comes from observing that ωgi,R,j = Op(1).
We observe that A21 can be expanded as a Taylor series of order R in the bandwidth hg. Moreover,
A21 = 0|hg=0 by A7-(i) as we have already shown above for A11 = 0|hG=0.
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Therefore, by A7-(i) we can apply a Taylor expansion around hg to obtain
‖A21‖ ≤
∑
Ij
∥∥∥∥∥c1hg + c2h2g2 + . . .+ cR−1 hR−1g(R− 1)! +O(hRg )
∥∥∥∥∥ .
We note that the remainder term vanishes, i.e.
√
LhRg = o(1) by A4.AN-(ii). The remaining R−1 terms
also vanish by A3-(iii). To see this observe that the kth coordinate of cρ, ρ = 1, . . . , R− 1 is
ckρ =
∂ρ
∂hρg
∫
[Hk(uhg + Y )−Hk(uhg + Y )]K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)du|hg=0
=
2∑
k1,...,kρ=1
∫
(uk1 . . . ukρ)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
∂ρ
∂Yk1 . . . ∂Ykρ
Hk(Y )du
−
2∑
k1,...,kρ=1
∫
(uk1 . . . ukρ)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
∂ρ
∂Yk1 . . . ∂Ykρ
Hk(Y )du
= 0,
where dHk/dY (y) = m1,k(ξ(y, i), x, i; θ0)g0(y, i). The third equality uses A3-(iii), that is since K1g(·) and
K2g(·) are higher order kernels, all moments of order strictly smaller than R− 1 vanish.
We consider next B12 in (A.9)
‖B12‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
`=1
1
I`(I` − 1)
I∑`
p=1
m1(Vp`,Z`;θ0)
√
L
[
1
gˆ(Bp`|Z`)g0(Bp`|Z`)
(
G0(Bp`|Z`)
g0(Bp`|Z`)
[gˆ(Bp`|Z`)− g0(Bp`|Z`)]2−
[
Gˆ(Bp`|Z`)−G0(Bp`|Z`)
]
[gˆ(Bp`|Z`)− g0(Bp`|Z`)]
)]∥∥∥∥∥
≤
(
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`(I` − 1)
I∑`
p=1
‖m1(Vp`, Z`; θ0)‖2
) 1
2
{
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`(I` − 1)
I∑`
p=1
L
[
1
gˆ(Bp`|Z`)g0(Bp`|Z`)
(
G0(Bp`|Z`)
g0(Bp`|Z`) [gˆ(Bp`|Z`)− g0(Bp`|Z`)]
−
[
Gˆ(Bp`|Z`)−G0(Bp`|Z`)
] [
gˆ(Bp`|Z`)− g0(Bp`|Z`)
])]2} 12
= B121B122,
where the inequality comes from Cauchy-Schwartz.
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First we show that B2121 <∞.
B2121 =
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`(I` − 1)
I∑`
p=1
‖m1(Vp`, Z`; θ0)‖2
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`(I` − 1)
I∑`
p=1
sup
θ∈Θ
‖m1(Vp`, Z`; θ)‖2
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`(I` − 1)
I∑`
p=1
K7(Vp`, Z`)
2
≤ 1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K7(Vp`, Z`)
2
= E[K7(V,Z)
2] + oas(1) <∞
where the second inequality comes from A6-(vi) and the fact that 0 < 1/(I` − 1) ≤ 1.
Next we show that B122 = o(1).
B122 =
{
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`(I` − 1)
I∑`
p=1
L
[
1
gˆ(Bp`|Z`)g0(Bp`|Z`)
(
G0(Bp`|Z`)
g0(Bp`|Z`)
[
gˆ(Bp`|Z`)− g0(Bp`|Z`)
]2
−
[
Gˆ(Bp`|Z`)−G0(Bp`|Z`)
] [
gˆ(Bp`|Z`)− g0(Bp`|Z`)
])]2} 12
<
√
L
{
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`(I` − 1)
I∑`
p=1
[
κ1
(
κ2O
(
1
rg2
)
−O
(
1
rG
)
O
(
1
rg
))]2} 12
≤
√
Lκ1
[
κ2O
(
1
rg2
)
−O
(
1
rG
)
O
(
1
rg
)]
= κ1
[
κ2O
(√
L
rg2
)
−O
( √
L
rGrg
)]
= o(1),
where we have used
•
∣∣∣∣∣ 1gˆ(Bp`|Z`)g0(Bp`|Z`)
∣∣∣∣∣ < κ1 <∞,
since densities are bounded away from zero and gˆ(Bp`|Z`) a.s−→ g0(Bp`|Z`)
•
∣∣∣∣∣G0(Bp`|Z`)g0(Bp`|Z`)
∣∣∣∣∣ < κ2 <∞,
since g0(·, ·) is bounded away from zero.
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•O
(
1
r2g
)
=
∣∣∣gˆ(Bp`|Z`)− g0(Bp`|Z`)∣∣∣2 = O(h2R1g + h2R2g + logLLh1gh2g
)
O
(
1
rG
)
O
(
1
rg
)
=
∣∣∣Gˆ(Bp`|Z`)−G0(Bp`|Z`)∣∣∣∣∣∣gˆ(Bp`|Z`)− g0(Bp`|Z`)∣∣∣
= O
(
hR+1G +
√
logL
LhG
)
O
(
hR1g + h
R
2g +
√
logL
Lh1gh2g
)
• For each `, 0 < 1/(I` − 1) ≤ 1.
Therefore, the second term in (A.9) is o(1), i.e. B12 = o(1)
Step 3.B2
We consider B2 in (A.8)
‖B2‖ ≤
√
L
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
‖m1(Vp`, Z`; θ0)−m1(V ∗p`, Z`; θ0)‖|Vˆp` − Vp`|
≤
√
L
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K6(Z`)|Vp` − V ∗p`||Vˆp` − Vp`|
≤
√
L
1
L
L∑
`=1
1
I`
I∑`
p=1
K6(Z`)(Vˆp` − Vp`)2
≤
√
L sup
p,`
(Vˆp` − Vp`)2 1
L
L∑
`=1
K6(Z`)
=
√
LOas
(
1
r2
)
Oas(1)
= Oas
(√
L
r2
)
Oas(1)
= Oas
(
L1/4
r
)
Oas(1) = oas(1),
where the second inequality comes from A6-(v), the third uses the fact that Vˆp` ≤ V ∗p` ≤ Vp`. The last
equality follows from A4.AN.
Therefore, the desired result follows. Q.E.D.
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Lemma A1: Let θˆ be defined as in (7). Then, under A1-A3, A4.AN and A5-A.7, we have
√
L(θˆ − θ0) =
√
L(θ˜ − θ0)− L(L− 1)
L2
2√
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
{∑
i
1
i(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)
g0(Yp`, i) + E
[∑
i
1
i(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
]}
+ op(1)
= − 1√
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
{
(CTΩC)−1CΩm(Vp`, X`, i; θ0) + 2
L(L− 1)
L2∑
i
1
i(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
−E
[∑
i
1
i(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
]}
+ op(1)
where C = E [∂m(V,X, i; θ0)/∂θ], and
N(Yp`, i) = [m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)/g0(Bp`|X`, i)2]G0(Bp`|X`, i).
Proof
From Proposition 2 we have
√
L(θˆ − θ0)−
√
L(θ˜ − θ0) = L(L− 1)
L2
2√
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
[rL(Yp`, i)− θL]
where
Yp` = (Bp`, X`)
rL(Yp`, i) = E[pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))|(Yp`, i)]
θL = E[rL(Yp`, i)] = E[pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))].
First we show that rL(Yp`, i) = −
∑
i
1
i(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i) + tL(Yp`, i).
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We observe that
rL(Yp`, i) = E[pL((Yp`, i), (Yqj , i))|(Yp`, i)]
=
{ ∫
pL((Bp`, X`, i), (Bqj , Xj , i))g0(Bqj , Xj , i)dYqj if ` 6= j∫
pL((Bpj , Xj , i), (Bqj , Xj , i))g0((Bpj , Xj , i), (Bqj , Xj , i)|(Bpj , Xj , i))dYqj if ` = j.
We consider first the case ` 6= j.
rL(Yp`, i) =
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
{∫ [
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
1
hG
ωGi,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
1
hG
ωGi,R+1,jKG
(
X` −Xj
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
]
g0(Yqj , i)dYqj
}
−1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
{∫ [
m1(Vp`, X`, i; θ0)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
G0(Bp`|X`, i)
g0(Bp`|X`, i)
1
h2g
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
+
m1(Vqj , Xj , i; θ0)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
G0(Bqj |Xj , i)
g0(Bqj |Xj , i)
1
h2g
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)]
g0(Yqj , i)dYqj
}
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
{∫ [
M(Yp`, i)
1
hG
ωGi,R+1,jKG
(
Xj −X`
hG
)
1I(Bqj ≤ Bp`)
+M(Yqj , i)
1
hG
ωGi,R+1,jKG
(
X` −Xj
hG
)
1I(Bp` ≤ Bqj)
]
g0(Yqj , i)dYqj
}
−1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
{∫ [
N(Yp`, i)
1
h2g
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
Xj −X`
hg
)
K2g
(
Bqj −Bp`
hg
)
+N(Yqj , i)
1
h2g
ωgi,R,jK1g
(
X` −Xj
hg
)
K2g
(
Bp` −Bqj
hg
)]
g0(Yqj , i)dYqj
}
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Yp`, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(u2)1I(Bp` ≤ u1hG +Bp`) +M(uhG + Yp`, i)
ωGi,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(u1hG +Bp` ≤ Bp`)
]
g0(uhG + Yp`, i)du
−1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫ [
N(Yp`, i)ω
g
i,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1) +N(uhg + Yp`, i)
ωgi,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
]
g0(uhg + Yp`, i)du.
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We note that as h = (hG, hg)→ 0 we have
rL(Yp`, i) → −1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫ [
N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)K1g(u)]K1g(u2)K2g(u1)
+N(Yp`, Ij)f
−1
m (X`, i)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
]
g0(Yp`, i)du
= −1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
where we have used the following
ωgi,R,j = e
T
1
[
1
nihg
ni∑
s=1
xsxs
TK1g
(
Xs −X`
hg
)]−1
[1 (Xj −X`) . . . (Xj −X`)R−1]T
= eT1
[
1
nihg
ni∑
s=1
xsxs
TK1g
(
Xs −X`
hg
)]−1
[1 (−u2hg) . . . (−u2hg)R−1]T
p−→ eT1
[
E
(
xsxs
TK1g
(
Xs −X`
hg
))]−1
e1 = f
−1
m (X`, i)
therefore we define
rL(Yp`, Ij) = −1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i) + tL(Yp`, i)
We consider now the reminder term tL(Yp`, i)
tL(Yp`, i) = rL(Yp`, i) +
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Yp`, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(u2)1I(Bp` ≤ u1hG +Bp`)
+M(uhG + Yp`, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(u1hG +Bp` ≤ Bp`)
]
g0(uhG + Yp`, i)du
−1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫ [
N(Yp`, i)ω
g
i,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1) +N(uhg + Yp`, i)
ωgi,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
]
g0(uhg + Yp`, i)du
+
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
52
Now, using
∫
K1g(u2)K2g(u1)du = 1 we can write
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
=
1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
K1g(u2)K2g(u1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)du
+
1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)N(Yp`, i)f−1m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)du
therefore we can write the reminder term as follows
tL(Yp`, Ij) =
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Yp`, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(u2)1I(Bp` ≤ u1hG +Bp`)
+M(uhG + Yp`, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(u1hG +Bp` ≤ Bp`)
]
g0(uhG + Yp`, i)du
−1
2
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
L
iLi
N(Yp`, i)ω
g
i,R,jK1g(u2)K2g(u1)g0(uhg + Yp`, i)du
−1
2
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
L
iLi
N(uhg + Yp`, i)ω
g
i,R,jK1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)g0(uhg + Yp`, i)du
+
1
2
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
1
i
N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)K1g(u2)K2g(u1)g0(Yp`, i)du
+
1
2
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
1
i
N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)g0(Yp`, i)du
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Yp`, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(u2)1I(Bp` ≤ u1hG +Bp`)
+M(uhG + Yp`, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(u1hG +Bp` ≤ Bp`)
]
g0(uhG + Yp`, i)du
−1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
N(Yp`, i)K1g(u2)K2g(u1)[
L
Li
ωgi,R,jg0(uhg + Yp`, i)− f−1m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
]
du
−1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)[
L
Li
ωgi,R,jN(uhg + Yp`, i)g0(uhg + Yp`, i)− f−1m (X`, i)N(Yp`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
]
du
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Yp`, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(u2)1I(Bp` ≤ u1hG +Bp`)
+M(uhG + Yp`, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(u1hG +Bp` ≤ Bp`)
]
g0(uhG + Yp`, i)du
−1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
N(Yp`, i)K1g(u2)K2g(u1)
[
f−1m (X`, i) + oas(1)
]
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[g0(uhg + Yp`, i)− g0(Yp`, i)]du
−1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)
[
f−1m (X`, i) + oas(1)
]
[N(uhg + Yp`, i)g0(uhg + Yp`, i)
−N(Yp`, i)g0(Yp`, i)]du
thus using the above expression we have
2√
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
[rL(Yp`, i)− θL] =
=
2√
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
{
− 1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
+E
[1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
]
+ tL(Yp`, i)− E[tL(Yp`, i)]
}
= − 2√
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
{
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
−E
[1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Yp`, i)f
−1
m (X`, i)g0(Yp`, i)
]}
+
2√
L
L∑
{`:I`=i}
1
i
i∑
p=1
[
tL(Yp`, i)− E[tL(Yp`, i)]
]
We denote the second term above by TL and we observe that E[TL] = 0. We now show that var[TL] =
oas(1).
var[TL] = 4
Li
L
var
[
1
i
i∑
p=1
t1(Yp1, i)
]
= 4
Li
L
E
{
var
[
1
i
i∑
p=1
t1(Yp1, i)
∣∣∣∣∣i
]}
+ 4
Li
L
var
{
E
[
1
i
i∑
p=1
t1(Yp1, i)
∣∣∣∣∣i
]}
= 4
Li
L
E
{
1
i
var
[
t1(Yp1, i)
∣∣∣∣∣i
]}
+ 4
Li
L
var
{
E [t1(Yp1, i)|i]
}
= A+B (A.24)
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We consider first the kth coordinate of the conditional variance inside the A term above, namely
var
[
t1k(Yp1, i)
∣∣∣i] ≤ E [t1k(Yp1, i)2∣∣∣i]
≤ O (h2G)+O (h2(R−1)g )
where the last inequality comes from observing that
t1k(Yp1, i) =
1
2
L
iLi
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Yp1, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(u2)1I(Bp1 ≤ u1hG +Bp1)
+M(uhG + Yp1, i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(−u2)1I(u1hG +Bp1 ≤ Bp1)
]
g0(uhG + Yp1, i)du
−1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
N(Yp1, i)K1g(u2)K2g(u1)f
−1
m (X1, i)
[g0(uhg + Yp1, i)− g0(Yp1, i)]du
−1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
K1g(−u2)K2g(−u1)f−1m (X1, i)[N(uhg + Yp1, i)
g0(uhg + Yp1, i)−N(Yp1, i)g0(Yp1, i)]du+ oas(1)
= a+ b+ c+ oas(1)
therefore, twice application of (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2) yields (a+ b+ c)2 ≤ κ(a2 + b2 + c2), thus
E
[
t1k(Yp1, i)
2
∣∣∣i] = E[(a+ b+ c)2|i] + oas(1)
≤ 4E[a2 + b2 + c2|i] + oas(1)
= O
(
h2G
)
+O
(
h2(R−1)g
)
+O
(
h2(R−1)g
)
where the order of the last two terms after the last equality above follows from an (R−1)th Taylor Expansion
around Yp1 and the fact that kernels are of order R− 1 by A.3-(iii).
We consider now the B term in (A.24) and more precisely we consider the following
B
4
=
Li
L
var
{
E [t1(Yp1, i)|i]
}
≤ E
{
E [t1(Yp1, i)|i]2
}
≤ E
{
E
[
t1(Yp1, i)
2|i] }
≤ O (h2G)+O (h2(R−1)g )+O (h2(R−1)g )
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where the last inequality follows from the same argument used above. Hence, by Chebyshev Inequality
TL = op(1).
We consider now the case ` = j and observe the following
rL(Ypj , i)
= E[pL((Bpj , Xj , i), (Bqj , Xj , i))|(Bpj , Xj , i)]
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
1
hG
[
M(Ypj , i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(0)1I(Bqj ≤ Bpj)
+M(Yqj , i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(0)1I(Bpj ≤ Bqj)
]
g0((Ypj , i), (Yqj , i)|(Ypj , i))dYqj
−1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
1
h2g
[
N(Ypj , i)ω
g
i,R,jK1g(0)K2g
(
Bqj −Bpj
hg
)
+N(Yqj , i)ω
g
i,R,jK1g(0)K2g
(
Bpj −Bqj
hg
)]
g0((Ypj , i), (Yqj , i)|(Ypj , i))dYqj
We now use the change of variable u = (Yqj − Ypj)/hG and u˜ = (Yqj − Ypj)/hg to obtain
rL(Ypj , i)
=
1
2
L
ni
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫
hG
[
M(Ypj , i)ω
G
i,R+1,jKG(0)1I(u1hG +Bpj ≤ Bpj) +M(uhG + Ypj , i)
ωGi,R+1,jKG(0)1I(Bpj ≤ u1hG +Bpj)
]
g0((Ypj , i), (uhG + Ypj , i)|(Ypj , i))du
−1
2
L
iLi
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫ [
N(Ypj , i)ω
g
i,R,jK1g(0)K2g(u˜1) +N(u˜hg + Ypj , i)
ωgi,R,jK1g(0)K2g(−u˜1)
]
g0((Ypj , i), (uhg + Ypj , i)|(Ypj , i))du˜
next, we observe that as h = (hG, hg)→ 0 we have
rL(Ypj , i) → −1
2
1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)
∫ [
N(Ypj , i)f
−1
m (Xj , i)K1g(0)K2g(u˜1)
+N(Ypj , i)f
−1
m (Xj , i)K1g(0)K2g(−u˜1)
]
g0((Ypj , i), (Ypj , i)|(Ypj , i))du˜
= −1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Ypj , i)f
−1
m (Xj , i)g0(Ypj , i)
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as before we define
rL(Ypj , i) = −1
i
∑
i
1
(i− 1)N(Ypj , i)f
−1
m (Xj , i)g0(Ypj , i) + tL(Ypj , i)
The rest of the proof is analogous to the one for the case ` 6= j. Therefore the desired result follows.
Q.E.D.
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